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1. INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has
always presented a complicated set of issues for a court
considering whether to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. When the foreign defendant's alleged conduct
occurred in the United States, a court's exercise of jurisdiction is
relatively noncontroversial. However, when the alleged conduct
of a foreign defendant occurred wholly outside of the United
States, courts have been more reluctant to subject foreign entities
to U.S. antitrust laws.
The doctrines regarding the extraterritorial application of the
civil provisions of U.S. antitrust laws are well-developed.
Although early opinions held that the Sherman Act and other
antitrust provisions could not reach the conduct of foreign
entities, the courts eventually discarded this position. Instead,
courts adopted a more flexible test which allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction if the defendant's conduct had a substantial effect,
actual or intended, on the commerce of the United States.' A
recent Supreme Court case further clarified the law as it applies to
civil violations.'
Although there has been tremendous development regarding
the civil provisions of the antitrust laws, there have been few
attempts to apply the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws to
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' See generally Sandra C. Hymowitz, Note, Extraterritorial Application of
the Sherman Act to Foreign Corporations, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (1986).
2 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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foreign defendants.3 In early 1997, however, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the criminal provisions of U.S.
antitrust laws applied to a foreign defendant whose conduct
occurred entirely in a foreign state.4 In reversing the district
court, the First Circuit essentially applied the same doctrines
applicable to civil violations of antitrust laws to the criminal
provisions and did not hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendants.
This comment explores the road leading to the First Circuit's
extension of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants whose conduct occurred entirely in a foreign state.
Section 1 discusses the growing importance of international
commerce to the world economy and gives an overview of the
relevant U.S. antitrust statutes. Section 2 traces the development
of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws through
judicial interpretation of the statutes. Section 3 explores the
opinions of the District Court and the First Circuit in United
States v. Nippon Paper Industry Co. Section 4 discusses the
problems raised by the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
U.S. courts and presents a criticism of the First Circuit's opinion.
This section also includes a discussion of foreign legislative
responses to the extension of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. In
Section 5, I argue that criminal antitrust jurisdiction should not
be extended to the foreign conduct of foreign defendants because
that path will certainly lead to greater international conflict over
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws. Finally, this comment
advocates a return to a reasonableness approach to the
extraterritorial exercise of criminal antitrust jurisdiction.
' In fact, in 1987, when the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
was published, the Reporters could find no case of criminal prosecution for an
economic offense against the United States carried out by a foreign entity
entirely outside of the United States which did not involve fraud. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 reporters' note 8
(1987).
' See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
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1.1. The Growing Importance of International Commerce and
the Consequences of the Extraterritorial Application of the
Criminal Provisions of U.S. Antitrust Law
International commerce and the rapid growth of transnational
economic connections have always hampered the ability of an
individual state to enforce its competition laws.' Advances in
technology and transportation, exacerbate these problems. The
formation of regional trading blocs, while easing enforcement
issues within the bloc, may also exacerbate the difficulties
between countries in different blocs. Adding to these problems
are different attitudes toward the enforcement of competition
law. Some states may view certain practices as offensive to
economic law and policy while others may view the identical
practices as desirable.6 Five international attempts to harmonize
the law of competition into a unified body of international law
have been attempted, but all of these attempts failed
1.2. United States Antitrust Statutes
The Sherman Act8 and the Clayton Act9 provide the primary
antitrust regulation prohibiting anticompetitive behavior. The
Sherman Act proscriptions are divided into two sections. Section
1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract,
s See Spencer Weber Wailer, The Internationalization of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 344 (1997). The U.S. antitrust laws
responded to the problems of enforcement in the face of interstate and
international commerce by moving enforcement from the states to the federal
government. See id.
6 One example of this conflict can be found in the British and American
attitudes toward regulation of the shipping industry. In the United Kingdom,
conferences, which are cartels of ship owners, "have been accepted for more
than a century as a necessary evil if stable, regular, and efficient scheduled
shipping services are to be maintained." A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J.
INT'LL. 257, 258 (1981).
It remains a policy of the British government to exempt such conferences
from its competition law and the competition law of other states. The United
States, however, considers conferences subject to and in violation of its
competition law This difference in philosophy has led to significant conflict
between the two nations. See id.
7 See Waller, supra note 5, at 349.
' 15 U.S.C. % 1-7 (1994).
9 15 U.S.C. % 12-27, 44 (1994).
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.""0 Section 2
prohibits monopolization, attempts at monopolization, and
combinations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate
or foreign commerce." Under each of these sections, violations
are considered criminal and are prosecuted as felonies that may
result in a fine, imprisonment or both. 2
Parties injured by violations of the Sherman Act or Clayton
Act may bring private rights of action. Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, a plaintiff may recover treble damages including
reasonable attorneys' fees and the cost of suit if the plaintiff can
prove that she was "injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 3
Each mode of enforcement (civil and criminal) has certain
advantages and disadvantages. In the civil context, treble damages
plus attorneys' fees and costs are extremely strong incentives
against violating the antitrust provisions. Either an unlawful
purpose or an anticompetitive effect constitutes a civil violation. 4
Furthermore, a civil plaintiff may obtain flexible relief in the
form of an injunction to prevent a defendant from engaging in
anticompetitive behavior.'
The criminal context requires the prosecution to meet a
higher standard of proof before a court will find a violation: the
prosecution must prove both intent to violate the antitrust laws
and an anticompetitive effect on commerce. 6 However, the
criminal provisions provide some powerful advantages for the
prosecution of antitrust violations as well. Criminal suits allow
the prosecuting party, which is the Department of Justice, to
employ a grand jury as a result of Justice's ability to compel
10 15 U.S.C. 5 1.
" 15 U.S.C. § 2.
12 See 15 U.S.C. % 1-2. The maximum fine for a corporation is
$10,000,000. The maximum fine for an individual is $350,000. Individuals
found guilty may also be imprisoned for up to three years. See id.
"3 15 U.S.C. S 15. Treble damages, attorneys' fees, and legal costs may be
recovered for violations of either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.
14 See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
15 See 15 U.S.C. % 4, 15-16.
16 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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witnesses to testify and to compel the production of documents.17
A criminal suit also allows the prosecution to offer immunity to
witnesses in exchange for testimony or other evidence that might
otherwise be impossible to discover.'
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
At first, courts interpreting the Sherman Act refused to apply
it to conduct of foreign corporations operating outside of the
United States. Slowly, however, jurisdiction over foreign
defendants was extended by the courts in the civil context. It was
this transition that set the stage for the extension of jurisdiction
over foreign defendant acting outside of the United States in
criminal antitrust proceedings.
2.1. From American Banana to Alcoa: The Evolution of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants in U.S.
Antitrust Civil Suits
Initially, the Sherman Act and other United States antitrust
laws could not reach the activities of foreign corporations if such
activities were carried out beyond the territorial limits of the
United States. 9 This position was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,20 the first
major case dealing with the Sherman Act in an international
context. American Banana involved two American corporations
with operations in South America. The plaintiff alleged that the
government of Costa Rica, under the influence of the defendant,
seized part of the plaintiff's plantation and supplies, thus
preventing the plaintiff from engaging in its business. A citizen
of Costa Rica then obtained a judgment from a Costa Rican court
declaring that the plantation belonged to him and not the
plaintiff. The defendant then bought the plantation from the
plaintiff.
2'
17 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDusTRAL MARKET STRucTuRE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 325 (3d ed. 1990).
s See id.
19 See Hymowitz, supra note 1, at 516.
20 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
21 See id. at 354-55.
1071
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
In an opinion delivered by Justice Holmes, the Supreme
Court held that a defendant did not violate the Sherman Act,
stating that "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."' The
Supreme Court interpreted the language of the Sherman Act as
covering "only every one subject to such legislation, not all that
the legislator subsequently may be able to catch."' Thus, under
the doctrine of American Banana, the possibility of the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. antitrust laws was entirely
foreclosed.
The rule in American Banana stood unmodified for only four
years. In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation
Co.24, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to
monopolize trade between various U.S. ports and several ports in
Canada. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could proceed
in its antitrust action against the defendants to the extent that the
acts occurred within the United States.25 In Thomsen v. Cayser,26
the defendants were owners of foreign steamship lines operating
between the United States and South Africa, who allegedly
formed "conferences" to prevent competition between themselves
and to stop new lines from entering the market. Once again, the
Supreme Court held that although the combination was formed
abroad by foreign corporations, it fell within the reach of U.S.
antitrust laws because it "affected the foreign commerce of this
country and was put into operation here."27
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. ,28 the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants, three American banks, two American
corporations, and a Mexican corporation, conspired to
22 Id. at 356.
23 Id. at 357.
24 United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87
(1913).
25 See id. at 106. The Court did not citeAmerican Banana in the opinion.
The cases are, however, distinguishable. InAmerican Banana, two domestic
corporations were engaged in conduct wholly outside of the United States. In
Pac-iic & Arctic Ry., the conduct did include activities which occurred in the
United States." See Hymowitz, supra note 1, at 517 n.39.
26 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
27 Id. at 88.
2 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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monopolize the importation and sale of sisal in the United States.
The defendants were able to persuade the governments of Mexico
and Yucatan to pass laws that restricted the sale of sisal and
discriminated in favor of the Mexican corporation. 9  The
Supreme Court once again allowed the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendants, reasoning that the primary defendants and
the acts which gave effect to the combination occurred in the
United States.30
Although the scope of foreign activities over which United
States courts were willing to exercise jurisdiction was expanding,
the rule in American Banana, which refused to extend jurisdiction
to activities that occurred entirely outside of the United States,
stood until 1945. In that year, the Second Circuit, sitting as the
court of last resort, extended antitrust jurisdiction in civil cases far
beyond the limits set by American Banana in the landmark case
United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America.3' In Alcoa, a
Canadian corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of an
American corporation, entered into two agreements, one in 1931
and the second in 1936 outside of the United States with foreign
producers of aluminum. These agreements sought to restrict the
amount of aluminum imported into various countries including
the United States through the implementation of a quota
system." In a dramatic break from the doctrine of American
Banana, Judge Learned Hand held that antitrust jurisdiction over
the conduct of foreign corporations which occurs outside of the
United States may be exercised if the acts were intended to affect
and actually did affect the foreign commerce of the United
29 See id. at 273.
"' See id at 276 (asserting that although the defendants were "aided by
discriminatory legislation," it was "their own deliberate acts, here and
elsewhere" that gave rise to the plaintiffs' complaint). The Court noted that
the factual situation of Sisal Sales was "radically different" from the one in
American Banana and thus refused to apply anAmerican Banana analysis. Id.
at 275.
31 United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
[hereinafter Alcoa]. The case was heard on appeal by the Second Circuit rather
than the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court could not find a quorum
of six justices qualified to hear the case. See id. at 421.
32 See id at 442-43. Neither agreement expressly mentioned the United
States. However, during the negotiations leading to the agreement, all of the
participants agreed that imports into the United States should be included. See
at 443.
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States.33 Under Alcoa, once the plaintiff has proven intent, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that their
conduct did not actually affect American commerce.34 Thus,
Alcoa was the final step in the erosion of the strict limitations
placed on extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust cases created by
American Banana.
2.2. The Rise of the Jurisdictional Rule ofReason
The Alcoa "intended effects" test firmly established the
possibility of antitrust jurisdiction over foreign defendants'
conduct under certain circumstances. That decision, however,
left many questions unanswered. The most pressing issues left
unanswered by Alcoa were the role of comity in the analysis, the
magnitude of the effect that must be present in the U.S. before
jurisdiction may be exercised, and the issue of conflicts between
U.S. and foreign law. These questions were at least partially
answered by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
ofAmerica N. T &S.A. 35
In Timberlane, the plaintiffs, an American corporation and
two Honduran corporations owned by the partners in the
American corporation, sought sources of lumber for its
operations in the United States. The American corporation
opened a new mill and reactivated an old mill in Honduras. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants sought to disrupt their
operations by seeking an "embargo" against Timberlane's
Honduran operations and using the embargo to shut down
Timberlane's Honduran mills.36
33 See id. at 443-44. Judge Learned Hand cited American Banana in his
opinion, but did not distinguish it from the case before the court. Judge Hand
did, however, note that "[w]e should not impute to Congress an attempt to
punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States. Id. at 444 (citingAmerican Banana, 213 U.S. at 347).
34 See Hymowitz, supra note 1, at 519. AlthoughAlcoa defined a new test
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, it failed to state how great the effects on
American commerce must be before antitrust jurisdiction may attach. See
Varun Gupta, Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J.
2287, 2290-91 (1996). For an early application of theAlcoa test, see generally
United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
" Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of AmericaN.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976).
36 An "embargo" under Honduran law is a court-ordered attachment of
property that is registered with the government of Honduras and prevents the
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In reversing the district court's dismissal of Timberlane's
complaint, the Ninth Circuit further elaborated on the
requirements for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
antitrust cases. The Timberlane court recognized that while
previous cases had established that U.S. antitrust laws could reach
certain extraterritorial acts, it certainly could not and should not
reach all such acts because at some point U.S. interests in
enforcing the law become too attenuated and the potential for
injury to foreign relations becomes too great.37 To define this
limit, the Timberlane court declined to apply an Alcoa effects test,
choosing instead to consider the interests of foreign countries and
observe "the limitations customarily observed by nations upon
the exercise of their powers."38
In considering more than just the actual or intended effects of
foreign conduct in the United States, the Ninth Circuit added an
additional prong to the Alcoa effects test.39 The new test would
consider the following factors:
the antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be
some effect- actual or intended- on American foreign
commerce before the federal courts may legitimately
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes.
Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be
necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large
to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws .... Third,
there is the additional question which is unique to the
international setting of whether the interests of, and links
sale of the property without a court order. The court appoints a judicial
officer to prevent the reduction of the property's value. See id. at 604.
17 See id. at 609.
38 Id.
" The Ninth Circuit criticized the effects test as being "incomplete
because it fails to consider the other nation's interests . . . [n]or does it
expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between the
actors and this country." Id. at 612-13. The court also noted that comity
concerns were probably already present in the effects test as applied by
American courts. See id. (stating that "the requirement for a 'substantial' effect
may silently incorporate [considerations of comity and the interests of other
nations], with 'substantial' as a flexible standard that varies with other
factors.").
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to, the United States- including the magnitude of the
effect on American foreign commerce- are sufficiently
strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority.'
Under this analysis, the third prong, the degree of conflict
between American and foreign law, results in what the
Timberlane court named a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
requiring a balancing of American and foreign interests.4' This
"rule of reason" requires the consideration of the following
factors:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
locations or principal places of business or corporations;
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance;
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United States
compared with those elsewhere;
(5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce;
(6) the foreseeability of such effect; and,
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.42
The Timberlane "rule of reason" thus represented a substantial
modification of the Alcoa effects test and represented an attempt
by the courts to identify and avoid potential conflicts with U.S.
40 Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 613-14.
42 Id at 614.
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foreign policy.43
The Third Circuit modified the Timberlane test in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.' In Mannington Mills,
the plaintiff sought treble damages and injunctive relief under
U.S. law, alleging that the defendant had secured foreign patents
by fraud.4" Reversing the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint, the Third Circuit explicitly included the
"possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief ' as a factor to be considered when
applying a Timberlane balance of interests test.46 The Mannington
Mills court also interpreted the Timberlane opinion as first finding
jurisdiction and then deciding whether its exercise was proper.47
If this is indeed the case, then the Timberlane and Mannington
Mills tests may be better seen as adding a second step to the
jurisdictional analysis by considering the possibility of judicial
4 See Hymowitz, supra note 1, at 522-23.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d. Cir.
1979).
41 See id. at 1290.
46 See id. at 1297. The factors cited by theMannington Mills court were: (1)
the degree of conflict with foreign law orpolicy; (2) the nationality of the
parties; (3) the relative importance of the alleged violations of conduct here
compared to that abroad; (4) the availability of a remedy abroad and the
pendency of litigation there; (5) the existence of intent to harm or affect
American commerce and its foreseeability; (6) the possible effect upon foreign
relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) if relief is
granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements
by both countries; (8) whether the court can make its order effective; (9)
whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances; and, (10) whether a treaty with the
affected nations has addressed the issue. Id. at 1297-98.
Although in theory a court applying a Timberlane or Mannington Mills
balance of interests test must consider foreign interests and potentia conflicts
with foreign policy goals, in practice, courts have been very reluctant to
relinquish jurisdiction. See Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicialand Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of US. Antitrustlaws and Viable Solutions Beyond the Timberlane/Restatement Comity
Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1277-78 (1994) (stating that the courts may
merely be paying "lip service" to the comity consideration, discounting theforeign interests involved and allowing jur sdi tion as long as the domestic
interest is "more than a de minimis United States regulatory interest").
" See Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the
Sherman Act Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 130, 147 (1982).
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abstention after determining that jurisdiction is proper."
2.3. A Move Away From International Comity:
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v
California" marked a sharp break from the two-part
Timberlane/Mannington Mills jurisdictional analysis. The Court
moved away from an international comity analysis and required a
strong showing of conflict between American and foreign law
before refusing to exercise jurisdiction."0
In Hartford Fire, nineteen states and numerous private
plaintiffs brought suit against domestic primary insurers,
domestic dealers of reinsurance, two domestic trade associations, a
domestic reinsurance broker, and reinsurers based in London."
The plaintiffs' complaints alleged that the defendants violated the
Sherman Act by conspiring to alter the terms of their domestic
general liability insurance policies.5 2 In particular, the California
complaint alleged that the London reinsurers violated the
Sherman Act by forcing primary insurers to use insurance forms
with clauses limiting the liability of the insurer, "thereby
rendering 'pollution liability coverage. . . almost entirely
unavailable for the vast majority of casualty insurance purchasers
in the State of California."' The London reinsurance defendants
did not argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
Sherman Act claims, rather, they argued that the interests of a
foreign state were sufficiently strong to overcome any U.S.
interest in the enforcement of its antitrust laws. 4
48 See id.
4" Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
50 See id. at 798-99.
$1 See id. at 778-80.
5 See id. at 770-71. More specifically, the defendants allegedly forced
insurers who sell insurance directly to consumers to make four changes to their
policies that would substantially reduce the risk and the cost to insurers of
issuing policies. See id. at 771-72. The defendants allegedly obtained these
concessions by several methods such as refusing to issue or renew reinsurance
to any insurer using standard insurance forms without the changes. See id. at
774-76.
13 Id. at 795.
"' See id. (stating that the position of the London reinsurance defendants, is
not that the Sherman Act does not apply in the sense that a minimal basis for
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The Supreme Court rejected this position, noting that the
London reinsurance defendants were engaged in conspiracies
which substantially affected the American market for insurance
and stating that "it is well established by now that the Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.""5
The Hartford Fire Court declined to apply a Timberlane comity
analysis. Rather, it stated that the question that must be
considered was whether "there is in fact a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law."56 A "true conflict" does not exist
"where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both." 7 In this case, since British law did not
require the defendants to act in some way prohibited by
American law and because compliance with both American and
British law was not impossible, there was no conflict and thus no
reason for U.S. courts to decline the exercise of jurisdiction."
Thus, the decision in Hartford Fire substantially alters the
analysis set forth in Timberlane and Mannington Mills. Under the
Hartford Fire approach, a court considering the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws first must find a substantial
effect on the commerce of the United States. 9 If there is such an
effect, then the court will apply American antitrust laws unless
doing so would force the defendant to violate the laws of a
the exercise of jurisdiction doesn't exist here.... [The London reinsurance
defendants'] position is that there are certain circumstances... in which the
interests of another State are sufficient that the exercise of that jurisdiction
should be restrained).
1s Id. at 796.
'6 Id. at 798 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (emphasis added).
L 7 See id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW S 403 cmt. e.). The Court noted that the London reinsurance defendants
and the Government of the United Kingdom both submitted briefs stating that
Parliament had created a regulatory regime and that the conduct of the
defendants was legal under British law. The Supreme Court rejected this
position, stating '[t]he fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took
place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws even
where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or encourage such
conduct." See d. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 415 cmt. j.).
58 See id.
'9 See Gupta, supra note 34, at 2296.
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foreign jurisdiction."' Only in this uncommon situation is a
Timberlane comity analysis possibly appropriate."
3. AN APPLICATION OF HARTFORD FIRE: THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S
EXTENSION OF THE HARTFORD FIRE OPINION TO CRIMINAL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Hartford Fire represents a significant departure from the
Timberlane/Mannington Mills approach in the civil context. The
Supreme Court, however, did not specifically address the
application of its decision to cases arising under the criminal
provisions of the antitrust laws. In United States v. Nippon Paper
Indus. Co.,62 the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Hartford Fire opinion to a case in the criminal context. This
section will explore both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals decisions.
3.1. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.: The District
Court Opinion
In 1995, a federal grand jury indicted Nippon Paper Industries
Co., Ltd., a manufacturer of facsimile paper based in Japan,
alleging that in 1990 Nippon Paper Industries and other unnamed
conspirators met in Japan and agreed to fix the price of thermal
facsimile paper in the United States.63  The scheme was
accomplished by selling the paper to unaffiliated trading houses
with the condition that they sell the paper in North America at
o See id.
61 See id. One commentator suggests that Hartford Fire abandoned
Timberlane in two ways. First, the opinion notes that Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a, does not require a court to refuse
jurisdiction on the basis of international comity. Second, by requiring the
finding of a "true conflict" before invoking a Timberlane comity analysis, the
Court severely restricted scope of Timberlane s applicability in fLture cases. See
id. at 2296-97.
62 Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 1.
63 Id. at 2. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. is the successor corporation
which resulted from a merger between two Japanese corporations, Jujo Paper
Co., Inc. and Sanyo Kokusaku Co., Ltd. The government brought its
complaint against Nippon Paper for the conduct of its predecessor,Jujo Paper
Co., Inc. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd. 944 F.Supp. 55,
58 (D. Mass 1996).
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inflated prices." The trading houses in turn shipped the paper to
North America and sold it through their American subsidiaries.
The indictment further alleged that Nippon Paper observed the
activities of the trading houses and ensured that the prices charged
to consumers were indeed the prices which it had secured through
the alleged conspiracy." The indictment asserted that since these
activities had a "substantial adverse effect on commerce in the
United States and unreasonably restrained trade," Nippon Paper
had violated section one of the Sherman Act.66
Nippon Paper moved to dismiss, claiming that if the conduct
had actually occurred, it had occurred entirely in Japan and thus
Nippon Paper was not subject to prosecution under the Sherman
Act.
67
After concluding that Nippon Paper had adequate contacts
with the United States to warrant the court's exercise of general
personal jurisdiction over it, the court turned to the question of
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in criminal
actions. The district court noted that this case presented an issue
of first impression concerning the extraterritorial reach of the
Sherman Act's criminal provisions.68 The government argued
that the same substantive language of the Sherman Act applies to
both civil and criminal violations, and therefore under the line of
cases dealing with civil applications of antitrust laws ending with
Hartford Fire, the Sherman Act clearly could reach extraterritorial
conduct in a criminal prosecution.69
The district court rejected this contention, stating flatly that
"the line of cases permitting the extraterritorial reach in civil




68 See Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 64. The district court based
its conclusion on the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
which states in the reporters' notes that "[n]o case is known of criminal
prosecution in the United States for an economic offense (not involving fraud)
carried out by an alien wholly outside the United States." RESTATEMENT
(THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 note 8 (1986).
69 See Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 64. The government cited
Hartford Fire which held that the civil sanctions of the Sherman Act apply "to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States." Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 795.
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actions is not controlling.""° Instead, the court applied the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal
statutes coupled with the Restatement's reluctance to apply the
criminal provisions of the antitrust statutes to foreign conduct.71
Reasoning that the extraterritorial provisions of the antitrust laws
would result in unfairness and unpredictability, the district court
dismissed the indictment against Nippon Paper and its
predecessor Jujo.2
3.2. Nippon Paper On Appea." The First Circuit's Opinion
The First Circuit disagreed with the district court's
conclusions and reversed the decision. 3 After presenting the
historical development of the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws in the civil context, the First Circuit held that the
criminal provision of the Sherman Act could reach wholly
extraterritorial conduct.74 It came to this conclusion by engaging
70 Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 65.
71 The district court cited EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991) for the presumption against the extraterritorial application of
federal statutes. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 65. In Arabian
American Oil Co., th2e Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 does not apply extraterritorially to U.S. firms employing U.S.
citizens abroad. See Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 258-59. The Court
stated that "[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
The Restatement's position on the extraterritorial application of statutes
with both civil and criminal provisions is summarized in the comments to
section 403 which state:
The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe set forth in § 402
and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil regulation.
However, in the case of regulatory statutes that may give rise to both
civil and criminal liability, such as United States antitrust and
securities laws, the presence of substantial foreign elements will
ordinarily weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases,
legislative intent to subject conduct outside the state's territory to its
criminal law should be found only on the basis of express statement or
clear implication.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 5 403 cmt. f (1986).
72 See Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 66.
'3 Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d 1.
74 See id. at 9.
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in statutory construction of the Sherman Act itself and by
reliance upon the holding in Hartford Fire. Each of these steps
will be considered in turn.
3.2.1. The Statutory Construction Argument and the
Application of the Hartford Fire Test
The court first noted that the language governing both civil
and criminal cases is exactly the same; therefore, "common sense"
would seem to dictate the extraterritorial application in both
situations.7" The First Circuit did not solely rely on "common
sense" however, citing "accepted canons of statutory
construction" to support its position. 6 The court noted that
identical words or terms used in different places in the same
statute must be interpreted in the same way, "not only when
particular phrases appear in different sections of the same act, but
also when they appear in different paragraphs or sentences of a
single section." 7 In this case, however, the argument is even
more powerful because the words used to impose both civil and
criminal liability are exactly the same words found in exactly the
same section of the same statute. Therefore, "the case for reading
the language in a manner consonant with a prior Supreme Court
interpretation is irresistible."7"
If the Sherman Act is construed using these canons of
interpretation, the court would (and did) conclude that the same
line of cases applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially in the
civil context must apply in the criminal context as well. Thus,
instead of formulating a new test, the court believed it was
obligated to apply the test in Hartford Fire.9
7 Id. at 4 (observing that "[w]ords may sometimes be chameleons,
possessing different shades of meanings in different contexts.., but common
sense suggests that courts should interpret the same language in the same
section of the same statute uniformly, regardless of whether the impetus for
interpretation is criminal or civil") (citations omitted).
76 Id. (citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235,
250-53 (1996)).
7 Id. at 5 (citing Russo v. Texaco, Inc., 808 F.2d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 1986)).
78 Id.
79 See id. at 9 ("We need go no further. Hartford Fire definitively
establishes that Section One of the Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign
conduct which has an intended and substantial effect in the United States. We
are bound to accept that holding.").
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3.2.2. The First Circuit's Rejection of the Restatement and
International Comity
The court's opinion attacked the reliance of the defendants, as
well as the district court, on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law and on notions of international comity. First, the
court dismissed comment f of section 403 of the Restatement as
"merely reaffirm[ing] the classic presumption against
extraterritoriality- no more, no less."8" Instead of reading
section 403 of the Restatement as creating a strong presumption
against the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, the court
interpreted the section as merely suggesting that "a country's
decision to prosecute wholly foreign conduct is discretionary."8
The First Circuit flatly rejected the defendants' assertion that
they must consider international comity in deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendants. 8 2 Under Hartford Fire's
"true conflict" test, comity only becomes a concern if the
Japanese laws forced the defendant to act in a way incompatible
with U.S. antitrust laws, or if compliance with both U.S. and
Japanese laws was impossible. The court reasoned that the
conduct alleged in the complaint was illegal under both U.S. and
Japanese laws, "thereby alleviating any founded concern about
[Nippon Paper] being whipsawed between separate sovereigns." "
Finally, the court's opinion engaged in a limited discussion of
reasonableness under section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law.84 The court concluded that jurisdiction
over the defendants was reasonable because of the international
character of commerce and the negative incentives that would be
created if jurisdiction were not exercised."
80 Id. at 7.
81 Id.
See id. at 8. (stating that "we see no tenable reason why principles of
comity should shield [Nippon Paper Industries] from prosecution"5.
83 Id.
84 See id.
8 We live in an age of international commerce, where decisions
reached in one corner of the world can reverberate around the globe in
less time than it takes to tell the tale. Thus, a ruling in [Nippon
Paper's] favor would create perverse incentives for those who would
use nefarious means to inluence markets in the United States,
rewarding them for erecting as many territorial firewalls as possible
1084 [19:4
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4.1. The First Circuit's Wrong Turn
The First Circuit was concerned that allowing a single section
governing both civil and criminal applications of antitrust laws to
have two different meanings "would open Pandora's jar." 6
Unfortunately, the court failed to realize that their extension of
the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws would exacerbate
what is already a serious problem in international economic law.
4.1.1. Before Nippon Paper: Problems in the Extraterritorial
Application of the Civil Sherman Act Provisions
In extending the reach of the criminal provisions of the
Sherman Act, the First Circuit ignored the long-standing and
growing criticism of the eagerness of U.S. courts to extend their
jurisdiction abroad. Long before Hartford Fire and Nippon Paper
were decided, many nations held the opinion that U.S. courts had
gone too far, and they expressed their displeasure through many
channels. In light of the recent developments in Nippon Paper,
the criticism of U.S. antitrust laws surely will increase.
One of the earliest examples of conflict between the United
States and another nation regarding the application of U.S.
antitrust laws occurred in the early 1950s. The conflict between
states has been particularly acrimonious between the United
States and the United Kingdom. In United States v. Imperial
Chemical Indus., Ltd.,7 the U.S. government alleged that the
defendants, several foreign and domestic corporations, conspired
to eliminate competition and divide world markets for several
chemical products, in particular, nylon, neoprene, and polythene.
The Imperial Chemical Industries, a British corporation, objected
to the exercise of jurisdiction over it. The court rejected this
defense and found minimum contacts on which to base
jurisdiction, holding that the existence of an American subsidiary
whose entire purpose was to carry out the business of Imperial
Chemical Industries was sufficient to establish the defendant's
between cause and effect.
See id.
86 Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993)
(en banc)).
" United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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presence in the jurisdiction." The court subsequently found that
a worldwide cartel had been formed to control the production
and distribution of nylon.89
The conflict between the judiciary of two states occurred
when the court attempted to fashion a remedy. The court noted
that there were several significant differences in the rights of
patent holders in the United States and the United Kingdom."
After finding that the patents were used to restrain trade in both
countries in violation of the laws and policies of both countries,
the court concluded the following:
[i]t does not seem presumptuous for this court to make a
direction to a foreign defendant corporation over which it
has jurisdiction to take steps to remedy and correct a
situation, which is unlawful both here and in the foreign
jurisdiction in which it is domiciled [and, i]t is not an
intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign for this
court to direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful
effects on the trade of the United States.9
A British court disagreed with this conclusion and refused to
honor the judgment, stating that the patent rights in controversy
were "a species of property.., which is English in character and
is subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts; and ... it is
not competent for the courts of the United States, or of any other
country, to interfere with those rights."92
Another example of foreign outrage over the extension of
88 See id. at 229.
89 See id. at 231-32. The patent issue arose because each of the defendants,
duPont and ICI, held certain patents which they had used to defeat
competition from other producers. See id. at 220-21. The court defined the
problem in finding a suitable remedy by stating,"[w]hile the maintenance of a
conpetitive economy is of prime importance, we may not seek to achieve that
end by unwarranted judicial whittling down of patent rights." Id. at 221.
90 See id. at 228-29 (discussing the differences between the patent laws of
the United States and the United Kingdom).
91 Id. at 229.
92 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 2 AllE.R.
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U.S. antitrust laws beyond American borders can be found in the
case In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.93  In that case,
Westinghouse Electric Corporation brought a civil antitrust suit
against twenty-nine foreign and domestic producers of uranium
alleging violations of U.S. antitrust law. Of these twenty-nine
defendants, nine of the foreign defendants refused to appear and
the court entered default judgments against each of them.94 On
appeal from an order entered against the defendants, the
governments of Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United
Kingdom filed briefs as amici curiae, each questioning the
jurisdiction of a U.S. court over the case.9" The court noted that
there was no opportunity for fact-finding because the defaulting
foreign corporations had, with the support of their respective
governments, steadfastly refused to appear and contest the
allegations in the complaint, making it nearly impossible for the
case to proceed. 96
Conflict with the government of other states has occasionally
persuaded courts to modify their decisions. In United States v.
General Electric Co.,97 the district court determined that General
Electric had attempted to monopolize the United States market
for incandescent electric lamps by organizing an international
cartel. The cartel consisted of licensing agreements between
foreign and domestic companies.9 One of the members of the
cartel was Philips, a Netherlands corporation. The court
confronted difficulties similar to those in Imperial Chemical when
it attempted to fashion a remedy in regard to Philips.99 The
Department of Justice advocated the elimination of all of the
" In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
94 See id. at 1250.
1s See id. at 1253.
96 See id. at 1254.
97 General Elec., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949).
98 See id. at 827-28, 847 (discussing the claims and also the Court's distinct
view).
" The court specifically exempted Philips from part of the judgment. The
court ordered that General Electric open its books and records to
representatives of the Department of Justice for inspection. The court did not
subject Philip's books and records held outside of the United States to the
measure, noting that it was "persuaded that international complications" made
the provision for observation of books and records "impracticable." See
United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 877-78 (D.NJ. 1953).
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licensing agreements. The government of the Netherlands,
however, complained to the United States Department of State
and demanded that the Department of Justice ask for a much
more limited decree in recognition of the laws and policy of the
Netherlands."° Although the court ordered Philips to make its
patents available to competitors, it conditioned the order by
stating that Philips would not be held in contempt of court "for
doing anything outside of the United States which is required or
for not doing anything outside of the United States which is
unlawful under the laws of the.., state in which Philips... may
be incorporated ... [or] may be doing business."
101
4.1.2. Foreign Legislative Responses to the Extension of U.S.
Antitrust Jurisdiction
Several foreign states have passed statutes attempting to block
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.
These statutes attempt to disrupt a foreign state's exercise of
jurisdiction by refusing to cooperate with the foreign tribunal, by
denying foreign litigants access to information, or in some cases
by allowing a defendant to escape a foreign judgment or by
reducing the judgment in the case of multiple damage awards.
One example of such a blocking statute is the British
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 (the "Interests
Act"). 2 The purpose of this legislation was to prevent British
individuals and firms from being subject to foreign economic and
commercial policies.3 The Interests Act provides three
protections. First, the Interests Act allows the British
government to forbid compliance with certain foreign court
orders and requests, if the orders "are damaging or threaten to
damage the trading interest of the United Kingdom." " The
government can also prohibit the production of documents or
'00 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 415 note 5
(1987).
101 General Elec., 115 F. Supp. at 878.
102 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, 1-8 (United
Kingdom).
103 See Lowe, supra note 6, at 257 (quoting the words of the United
Kingdom's Secretary of State for Trade).
" Protection of Trading Interests Act § 1(1)(b).
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other information in foreign courts,"'5 and courts may not allow a
foreign request for evidence if such request "infringes the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to
the sovereignty of the United Kingdom." 06 Second, the Interests
Act prohibits the enforcement of foreign judgments which award
multiple damages or which stem from the regulation or
prohibition of restrictive or anticompetitive practices.' Third,
the Interests Act provides for the recovery of the
noncompensatory element of awards of multiple damages by a
British defendant from the party in whose favor the judgment
was entered.0 8 The Interests Act's language generally applies to
all foreign states, but the Interests Act is primarily aimed at the
United States because the United Kingdom often considers U.S.
conduct highly intrusive.'09
Other countries have adopted similar acts. For example,
Canada has adopted blocking statutes at both the federal and
provincial level. At the federal level, the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act (the "Act") provides that the government of
Canada may prohibit the production of documents or other
information by a Canadian citizen or corporation.10 The Act
also allows the government to block actions taken by a foreign
state or tribunal if the act affects international trade or commerce
and "has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect
significant Canadian interests in relation to international trade or
commerce involving business carried on in whole or in part in
Canada or that otherwise has infringed or is likely to infringe
Canadian sovereignty." Similar laws were enacted in both
Ontario and Quebec.1 Once again, although these laws apply to
105 See id. § 2(1)(a)-(b).
106 Id. § 4.
107 See id. § 5(1)-(6).
108 See id. § 6(1)-(2).
109 See Lowe, supra note 6, at 257 ("Although the Act is directed against
foreign authorities generally, it is well known that it is primarily intended to
deal with what are seen as incursions upon British jurisdiction and trading
interests by the authorities of the United States.").
11 See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29, § 3(1)(a)-(c)
(1985) (Can.).
102d. 5(A.
, The Business Concerns Records Act (the "Quebec Act") and the
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any foreign state, the Act is primarily intended to discourage the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws."'
5. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TEST FOR THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE CRIMINAL ANTITRUST PROVISIONS
The extent to which the criminal provisions of U.S. antitrust
laws should be applied extraterritorially presents an unusually
difficult problem. On one hand, a return to the American Banana
doctrine could potentially result in damage to American interests
and would effectively render U.S. economic policy impotent. On
the other hand, Nippon Paper, as well as Hartford Fire, will
certainly lead to even greater international conflict. The
extension of criminal jurisdiction in Nippon Paper may result in
foreign retaliation against American corporations and individuals.
There is no simple solution to the problem of the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. Nonetheless,
American courts should not follow the path of Nippon Paper and
Hartford Fire. This section proposes a return to a modified
Timberlane/Mannington Mills/Restatement analysis.
5.1. A Criticism of the First Circuit's Nippon Paper Opinion
In extending criminal antitrust jurisdiction extraterritorially,
the First Circuit merely applied the holding in Hartford Fire after
engaging in a brief investigation of the meaning behind the
Sherman Act. Unfortunately, this approach stretches the
Hartford Fire opinion much too far.
The First Circuit cites a number of cases for the proposition
that identical words which cover both civil and criminal
violations should be interpreted in the same way. However, the
Court cited no cases that mandated parallel interpretations that
Business Records Protections Act (the "Ontario Act") are similar to the
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act in that they too prohibit Canadian
entities from complying with foreign orders or requests in some circumstances.
See Business Records Protections Act, R.S.O. ch. B-19 (1990) (Can.) (Ontario's
blocking statute); Business Concerns Records Act, R.S.Q. ch. D-12 (1977)
(Can.) (Quebec's blocking statute).
"' See Mark A. A. Warner, Hunt v. Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 532, 533 (1994) ("Successive Canadian Governments have long been
troubled by the extraterritorial application of a range of U.S. laws dealing with
matters such as the effect in the United States of violations of U.S. antitrust
laws by actors located outside the United States.").
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implicated international issues. For example, the Court cites
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co."' for the proposition
that where a statute has both criminal and civil sanctions, the
court must apply uniform interpretations to both contexts.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., however, concerned a statute that
levied a tax on certain firearms."' In a footnote, the plurality
noted that the rule of lenity"6 could be applied to this statute and
the interpretation should be the same for suits arising under both
the tax and the criminal provisions.11 The Court also cites
Ratzlafv. United States for a similar proposition.'
The case for a single construction of a statute with both civil
and criminal penalties loses its force when considered in the
international context. First, when the criminal penalties affect
other states and their subjects, the extension of jurisdiction may
be particularly offensive,"' Second, even the agencies that enforce
the statutes with both civil and criminal provisions generally
agree that "criminal jurisdiction over activity with substantial
foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil
jurisdiction over the same activity, and only upon strong
justification."12 ° Enforcement agencies no doubt realize that
zealous criminal prosecutions of foreign entities may have serious
repercussions for American corporations and individuals abroad
and may damage foreign relations with other states. Most
114 United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
11 The statute also has criminal applications. See id. at 518 n.10.
116 The rule of lenity is a doctrine "by which courts decline to interpret
criminal statutes so as to increase penalty imposed, absent clear evidence of
legislative intent to do otherwise; in other words, where there is ambiguity in a
criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of defendant." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990).
117 Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 518 n.10.
118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). InRatzlaf, federal law
required banks to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000 to the
Department of the Treasury. The statute at issue forbids transactions to be
broken up in order to avoid the reporting requirement. The Court held that
the phrase "willfully violating" must be applied uniformly throughout the
statute. See id. at 143.
119 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403
reporters' note 8 (1986) ("In applying the principle of reasonableness, the
exercise of criminal (as distinguised from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts
committed in another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive.").
120 Id.
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extensions of criminal statutes to extraterritorial conduct involve
"serious and universally condemned offenses, such as treason or
traffic in narcotics, and to offenses by or against military
forces."121 Comment f of section 403 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law states:
The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe set forth
in 5 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to
civil regulation. However, in the case of regulatory
statutes that may give rise to both civil and criminal
liability, such as United States antitrust and securities laws,
the presence of substantial foreign elements will ordinarily
weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases,
legislative intent to subject conduct outside the state's
territory to its criminal law should be found only on the
basis of express statement or clear implication."
The First Circuit dismissed the Restatement as "merely
reaffirm[ing] the classic presumption against extraterritoriality-
no more, no less."" This Restatement comment, however, must
be read in the context of both section 402 and section 403. The
bases of jurisdiction in section 402 include extraterritorial conduct
which has a substantial effect, actual or intended, within the
United States. 24 However, the analysis does not end with section
402. Under section 403, jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
is not allowable where it is "unreasonable."2 ' Even if jurisdiction
would be reasonable, a state may have to defer the exercise of
jurisdiction when the interests of another state are greater than its
121 Id. For a discussion of extraterritorial bases of criminal jurisdiction, see
generally, Christopher L. Blakesley, United States jurisdiction Over
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982).
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. f
(1987).
' Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 7.
124 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 402(3)
(1987).
125 Id. S 403(1). In deciding whether jurisdiction is reasonable, a court
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own.126 Thus, while Comment f, read out of context, may restate
the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is part of a larger
analysis which requires a court to balance competing interests and
expectations.
The First Circuit noted that "nothing in the text of the
Restatement proper contradicts the government's interpretation
of Section One" and cited section 402(1)(c) and section 415(2) to
support its contention that the only requirement for
extraterritorial jurisdiction is a substantial, actual or intended,
effect in the United States.1"' However, both of these sections
must be read in light of the criteria for reasonableness set forth in
section 403.128
One of the main problems created by the Nippon Paper
opinion is that it fails to limit itself effectively. The First Circuit
observed that "[w]e live in an age of international commerce,
where decisions reached in one corner of the world can
reverberate around the globe in less time than it takes to tell the
tale." 129  Thus, declining to exercise extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction would create perverse incentives to foreign entities by
allowing them to escape criminal prosecution by simply being
absent from the United States. However, the Court only
identified half of the problem. While the extension of criminal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants may catch more violators of
U.S. antitrust laws, it will certainly result in U.S. overreaching
and may potentially be abused by enforcement agencies. For
example, it is possible that forms of industrial organization which
are perfectly legal in other countries could violate U.S. antitrust
laws and result in prosecution within the United States, even if
the conduct occurs entirely in the foreign jurisdiction. 3 Thus,
126 See id. S 403(3).
12 Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 7.
128 Section 402 explicitly states that it is "[s]ubject to § 403."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
Comment e of section 415 also incorporates the factors in section 403. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 415 cmt. a (1987)
(This section applies the general principles of sections 402 and 403 to
regulation by the United States of anticompetitive conduct.").
129 Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8.
130 For example, many industries in Japan are organized in structures
called keiretsu. A vertical keiretsu is made up of suppliers, distributors, and
financial institutions which service a specific manufacturing concern within an
1093
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
the United States could attempt to alter the economic policy of
other nations through the application of its criminal law to
foreign corporations and citizens.13' The proper forum for the
discussion and negotiation of economic policy among sovereign
states is not in the criminal courts of the United States.
Furthermore, a test that relies on the substantial effects doctrine
without the requirement of reasonableness would result in many
prosecutions in the United States which would better be heard in
other jurisdictions. As the First Circuit noted, the volume of
international commerce and the connections between states are
rapidly increasing. As nations become increasingly inter-
dependent in their economic relations, there would be little
conduct that would not potentially have a substantial effect in the
United States. Parties acting in world markets could find
themselves with the heavy burden of defending against criminal
liability in the United States.
5.2. A Proposalfor a New Test
Under this proposed test, criminal antitrust jurisdiction over
industry. A horizontal keiretsu is comprised of manufacturers from different
industries, a trading company, a bank, and insurance companies. See Ronald J.
Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 883 n.48
(1993). This organization is typical of many industries that have a large export
presence in the United States. Although these organizations are legal and
encouraged under Japanese economic policy, they may be offensive to U.S.
economic law and policy. Under a "substantial effects" test not moderated
with a reasonableness requirement, the United States could attempt to
prosecute many of the keiretsu in the United States, thus imposing U.S.
economic policy on other sovereign states.
131 In particular, U.S.-Japanese relations could suffer. One of the principle
problems between the two countries involves the enforcement of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law. The United States believes that the Japanese government
has been too reluctant to enforce the law. The Japanese government, however,
believes that its enforcement has been reasonable. See Alex Y. Seita & Jiro
Tamura, The Historical Background ofJapan's Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 115, 118 (1994). Given the opportunity, the United States government
may employ its own antitrust enforcement agencies to rectify this problem by
using U.S. criminal law instead of engaging in the much more difficult
diplomatic negotiation.
On an ironic note, it was the United States that forced the Japanese to
enact the Antimonopoly Law following the Allies victory in World War II.
Indeed, the entire concept of American competition law was foreign to them.
See id. at 122.
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foreign defendants acting entirely outside of the United States
may only be exercised when the conduct of the defendants passes
a three-part test.
First, the defendant's conduct must have either a substantial
effect or must have been intended to have a substantial effect on
the commerce or trade of the United States.132  Both the
Restatement and this test rely on a territorial approach to
jurisdiction.' Thus, the first part of this test adopts traditional
principles of jurisdiction accepted by U.S. courts for many
years. Requiring substantial actual or intended effects in the
United States before exercising jurisdiction prevents the use of
U.S. antitrust laws as a weapon in a battle between foreign
entities without any connection to the United States.13
Jurisdiction may not be exercised just because the conduct of
the defendants had a substantial effect, actual or intended, in the
United States. Rather, jurisdiction may only be exercised where
it would be "reasonable" to do so. The courts in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills and the drafters of the Restatement each
proposed a multiple factor test for reasonableness. The main
thrust of all of these tests is the identification of a conflict of
132 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
Section 402 lists three bases for jurisdiction recognized by international law:
territoriality, nationality, and passive personality. Other commentators have
recognized five bases for the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction:
territoriality, nationality, the protective principle, the passive personality
theory, and the universal theory. See Christopher L. Blakesley, supra note 120,
at 1110-11.
13 See id. at 1126-27 ("Thus, the basis for the expansion of jurisdiction over
actions in violation of United States antitrust laws has usually been the
objective territoriality principle, in so much as the effect of such violations
occurs within United States territory.").
134 See id. at 1123 ("American law has traditionally allowed the assertion of
jurisdiction over offenses when the conduct giving rise to the offense has
occurred extraterritorially, as long as the harmful effect(s) or result(s) take
place within the jurisdiction's territorial boundaries (objective territoriality).").
135 For an example of a foreign plaintiff bringing suit in the United States
under U.S. antitrust laws in connection with conduct occurring almost entirely
in France and without any substantial impact on American trade or commerce,
see Filetecb S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The
plaintiff brought suit after the defendant refused to provide a French telephone
directory with certain names removed. The plaintiff's only connection to the
United States was the formation of a U.S. subsidiary which would sell this list
to direct marketers in the United States who wished to market products in
France. See id. at 466.
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interests between states, and the state with the lesser interest
deferring to the state with the greater interest in the dispute.136
Under this proposed test, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
only after evaluating a set of relevant factors. Probably the most
comprehensive and useful set of factors is set forth in section 403
of the Restatement, which lists the following factors:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating
state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place
within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the
importance of regulation to the regulating state, the
extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulations is consistent with
the traditions of the international system;
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 403(3)
(concluding that "in light of all the relevant factors ... a state should defer to
the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater."); see also Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 614-15 ("Having assessed the conflict, the court should determine
whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United States are
sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction."); see also
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297 (stating that one factor in determining
reasonableness is the "relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct
here compared to that abroad").
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(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state.1
37
Under this proposed test, several additional factors would be
considered. First, where the United States and another nation
may have jurisdiction over the defendant, the U.S. court would
consider the incentive the other interested state has in prosecuting
the conduct if U.S. courts did not exercise jurisdiction. For
example, in Nippon Paper, Judge Lynch noted in his concurrence
that the conduct stated in the complaint only affected American
consumers, so the Japanese government had little incentive to
prosecute improper conduct. 38 The incentive problem is most
severe when dealing with export cartels. States have little
incentive to prosecute export cartels because their behavior only
affects consumers in other countries. For example, the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 exempts
anticompetitive behavior in export trade or commerce from
prosecution under the Sherman Act. However, activities abroad
which have a substantial effect in the United States or on the
import trade of the United States are not exempted. 3  Thus,
where a foreign state's exports to the United States indicate
anticompetitive behavior, this criterion would justify U.S. courts
who exercise jurisdiction.
Second, U.S. courts should consider the degree of conflict
with other countries' economic policies, including their industrial
structure. One of the primary problems with the "true conflicts"
test of Hartford Fire is that it only considers conflicts between
U.S. and foreign laws in which it is impossible to comply with
both sets of laws or regulations."4 The proposed test recognizes
137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 403 (1987).
For the Timberlane factors, see 549 F.2d at 614. For the Mannington Mills
factors, see 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
138 See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 12.
139 See 15 U.S.C. S 6a, 45(a)(3).
14 See Sociit6Nationale IndustrielleAerospatiale, 482 U.S. 522 at 555 (1987),
cited in Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
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that other states have economic policies which may differ from
those of the United States and that U.S. courts should not allow
U.S. enforcement agencies to attack those policies using U.S.
antitrust law. Courts, though, could consider the regulatory and
policy regimes of other countries in determining whether to
allow the extraterritorial exercise of antitrust jurisdiction.
However, courts should not refuse to extend antitrust jurisdiction
solely because another state has a strong policy of encouraging
certain conduct. 41  Rather, courts should consider industrial
organization only as part of a larger analysis which also examines
all of the named factors.
Third, a court contemplating extension of criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant should consider the
availability and adequacy of alternate remedies for the aggrieved
party. As previously noted," many countries regard the
imposition of criminal jurisdiction as particularly intrusive. A
civil suit rather than a criminal prosecution would avoid many of
the problems created by the Nippon Paper opinion and may even
provide better remedies for the plaintiff, namely treble damages
or injunctive relief. For conduct that occurred entirely outside of
the United States and affected parties with operations in the
country in which the conduct occurred, the court should consider
the availability of remedies in the judicial system of the foreign
state. Seeking a remedy in the state in which the conduct
occurred solves several problems. First, the local court would
have easier and more convenient access to evidence. Second, it
avoids the application of blocking statutes and other devices
aimed at restricting foreign access to records. Third, it prevents
parties from using U.S. antitrust laws as weapons against
competitors in conflicts involving the parties' conduct in other
countries.
The third step in this proposed test may require that U.S.
courts relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign defendant even if the
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. If the regulations of
two states conflict such that compliance with both sets of
141 The Restatement takes a similar position. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 415 cmt. j (1987) ("Ordinarily, the fact that
conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar
application of the United States antitrust laws.").
142 Seesupra note 118.
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regulations is impossible, U.S. courts should carefully analyze the
interests of the United States and of the foreign state. If the
interests of the foreign state are greater, U.S. courts should defer
the exercise of jurisdiction to the other state.'43 This prong of the
test is similar to the "true conflicts" test set forth in Hartford Fire.
Deference to the other state only occurs under this prong if it is
actually impossible to comply with both sets of regulations.
6. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit's extension of criminal antitrust jurisdiction
to foreign defendants acting in foreign states will certainly lead to
greater conflict between the United States and its trading
partners. Foreign states, already uncomfortable with the reach of
U.S. laws, are certain to react negatively to this development.
A better approach to the problem of criminal conduct of
foreign entities in foreign states is to return to a Restatement-style
"reasonableness" analysis. By allowing jurisdiction in cases where
the foreign conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. trade or
commerce, where the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, and
where there would be no conflict with foreign law if there was
compliance with U.S. law, U.S. courts could address potential
antitrust violations that may reduce efficiency and unfairly
damage U.S. business interests while avoiding as many conflicts as
possible with other states who may view the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over their subjects as unreasonably intrusive and
unwelcome.
... See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(3)
(1987). This prong may require one state modifying or eliminating a regulation
or interpreting a statute in such a way as to avoid conflict. See id. S 403 cmt. e.
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